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THE GENETIC FALLACY AND A LIVING
CONSTITUTION
Charles L. Barzun*
Should the historical origins of some principle or practice
affect how we think about it today? Under one standard view, the
answer is “no”; to think otherwise is to commit a fallacy—the
genetic fallacy. 1 But in legal argument, origins often seem to
matter a great deal. This Essay takes up the question of whether,
or under what conditions, it is right for them to do so.
To motivate the inquiry, consider a recent example of such
an argument. This past spring the Supreme Court, in a per curiam
opinion, declined to consider the issue of whether the
Constitution barred Indiana from prohibiting “sex-, race-, or
disability-selective abortions by abortion providers.” 2 Such
denials of writs of certiorari tend not to receive much attention,
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. I would like to thank
Andrew Coan, Justin Desautels-Stein, and, especially, Brian Tamanaha for helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Thanks also to the participants of workshops
at the James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona, at the Conference on
History, Ideology and the Law, and at the annual conference of the American Society of
Legal History, where earlier drafts of this paper were presented. Finally, I’d like to thank
Ivy Ziedrich for helpful research assistance.
1. I use the term here in the ordinary sense that describes an inference from
premises about the origins of some claim, practice, or theory to conclusions about its nature
or truth. See Kevin C. Klement, When is Genetic Reasoning Not Fallacious, 16
ARGUMENTATION 383, 384 (2002) (explaining that the term “genetic fallacy” is often used
in a general way to refer to the fallacy of “confusing something’s origins with its nature,
whether or not that something is a belief or theory”). See also Logically Fallacious,
https://www.logicallyfallacious.com/tools/lp/Bo/LogicalFallacies/99/Genetic-Fallacy (last
visited Nov. 3, 2019) (characterizing the genetic fallacy as “basing the truth claim of an
argument on the origin of its claims or premises”). The term also has been used in a more
technical, though related, sense to refer to various forms of reasoning in the philosophy of
science. See, e.g., Norwood Russell Hanson, The Genetic Fallacy Revisited, 4 AM. PHIL. Q.
101 (1967) (surveying various formulations of the alleged fallacy); T. A. Goudge, The
Genetic Fallacy, 13 SYNTHESE 41 (1961) (canvassing different formulations); MORRIS
COHEN & ERNEST NAGEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD 382
(1936).
2. Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky, Inc., No. 18-483, slip op. at 1
(U.S. May. 28, 2019).

429

02 BARZUN_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

430

12/23/2019 10:39 AM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 34:429

but Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a lengthy concurrence that
made news. Thomas suggested that Indiana might have a
“compelling interest” in “preventing abortion from becoming a
tool of modern-day eugenics.” 3 As evidence, he pointed to the
way in which the history of abortion was at times wrapped up with
the eugenics movement. For instance, Margaret Sanger, the
founder of respondent’s parent organization, Planned
Parenthood, advocated the use of birth control in order to reduce
“ever increasing, unceasingly spawning class of human beings who
never should have been born at all,” 4 and a later president of
Planned Parenthood, Alan Guttmacher, specifically “endorsed
the use of abortion for eugenic reasons.”5 Justice Thomas went on
to show the way in which the eugenics movement was embraced
by the Nazis and more generally reflected an ideology of white
supremacy.6
The response to Thomas’s opinion was swift and fierce. Some
insisted that he got the history wrong, 7 others observed that
Sanger herself had opposed abortion,8 and still others argued that
linking the Indiana law to eugenics required too capacious a
definition of what “eugenics” includes.9 But for my purposes the
relevant criticism leveled was an objection to the form of
Thomas’s argument. It amounted, according to both an historian
and a legal scholar, to a charge of “guilt by association.”10 Justice
Thomas was effectively arguing, Professor Michael Dorf
3. Id. at 2.
4. Id. at 3 (Thomas, J., concurring).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 6–8.
7. Adam Cohen, Clarence Thomas Knows Nothing of My Work, ATLANTIC (May
29, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/clarence-thomas-used-mybook-argue-against-abortion/590455/
8. Eli Rosenberg, Clarence Thomas tried to link abortion to eugenics. Seven
historians told The Post he’s wrong, WASHINGTON POST (May 30, 2019, 8:50 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2019/05/31/clarence-thomas-tried-link-abortioneugenics-seven-historians-told-post-hes-wrong/?utm_term=.0ac541c5d02d.
Thomas
acknowledged as much in his opinion. Box, supra note 2, at 9.
9. Michael C. Dorf, Clarence Thomas’s Misplaced Anti-Eugenics Concurrence in the
Indiana Abortion Case, THE TAKE CARE BLOG (May 30, 2019), https://takecareblog.com
/blog/clarence-thomas-s-misplaced-anti-eugenics-concurrence-in-the-indiana-abortioncase.
10. Alexandra Minna Stern, Clarence Thomas’s Inaccurate Linking Abortion to
Eugenics is as Inaccurate as it is Dangerous, NEWSWEEK (May 31, 2019) (arguing that
“Thomas has thrown down the guilt-by-association gauntlet and cleaved open new space
in the language and culture wars of reproductive rights”); Dorf, id. (“[Thomas’s] argument
really does appear to be one of guilt by association.”).
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concluded, “that because some people once favored a legal right
to abortion for a bad reason, it should be banned today.”11
Put differently, these scholars accused Thomas of committing
the genetic fallacy.12 That term (ironically, given the context here)
has nothing directly to do with genetics in the biological sense.
Instead, it describes the process of using facts about the origins of
some belief or practice to support an inference (positive or
negative) about the truth of the belief or of the claims that the
practice embodies. So, the reasoning goes, the fact that some
people supported abortion for (“bad”) eugenicist reasons is
irrelevant to whether today (“good”) non-eugenicist reasons exist
to support the availability of abortion.
What is striking about this critique is that such “genetic”
arguments have a long tradition in the disciplines of both history
and law. Take history first. Anytime an historian offers an account
of the history of some practice or rule as an effort to “debunk” its
current status or prominence, they are committing the “genetic
fallacy.” Charles Beard famously argued that the Framers were
motivated primarily by their class and financial interests.13 To the
extent that his work was understood to challenge the sanctity with
which the constitutional structure was regarded in his day, such
reasoning depends on the genetic fallacy.14 Similarly, a generation
of critical legal historians sought to undermine current legal
regimes by arguing that the doctrines that comprise them

11. Dorf, supra note 9.
12. Ross Douthat, Clarence Thomas’s Dangerous Idea, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/01/opinion/sunday/clarence-thomas-abortion.html
(observing that one response among pro-choice progressives to Thomas’s opinion was to
argue that Thomas was guilty of the genetic fallacy).
13. CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES (1913).
14. For a recent neo-Beardian interpretation of the Founding, see MICHAEL J.
KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
(2016). Professor Klarman makes clear that he thinks his account poses a challenge to
theories of constitutional interpretation that privilege the Framers’ views. See id. at 631
(observing that “those who wish to sanctify the Constitution are often using it to defend
some particular interest that, in their own day, cannot in fact be adequately justified on its
own merits”).
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originally developed to serve narrow, class interests.15 They, too,
commit the alleged fallacy.16
Such arguments are probably even more common in broader
political and cultural debates in which history is deployed in order
to attack current policies or programs. Suggestions are legion, in
both popular and “elite” publications, that learning of the sinister
origins of some policy should make us suspicious of that policy
today.17 The New York Times’s recent 1619 Project has garnered
considerable attention and controversy precisely because it
indicts everything from arguments for states’ rights to domestic
sugar production to modern-day corporate culture by tracing the
history of such policies and practices back to slavery.18
And those are just the debunking efforts. Arguments that
look to historical origins to support a present practice (or, to use
Simon Blackburn’s felicitous term, “bunking” accounts) are far
more common in legal argument.19 Consider how often lawyers
(and even normal people, too) quote one of the Founders on some
15. See, e.g., MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW:
1780–1860 (1977). See also Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV.
57, 75 (1984) (“The great contribution of this [type of legal history] has been to put social
structure, class, and power—whose very existence much liberal legal writing seems so
astonishingly to deny—back into our accounts of law.”); Robert W. Gordon, Historicism
in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1021 (1981) (“Perhaps more disturbing is the
possibility that the critic, searching like the legal scholar for pattern and regularity in legal
materials, will uncover a pattern, but not one that the scholar would wish to find. The critic
might, for example, attempt to explain legal texts as determined, in an important sense, by
some contextual variable such as the politics of a dominant class or temporarily dominant
political coalition . . . .”).
16. The classic example of this form of historical debunking argument, which are
sometimes called “genealogies” for this reason is FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, 10 THE WORKS
OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE: A GENEALOGY OF MORALS 35 (Alexander Tille ed., William
A. Hausemann trans., 1897) (arguing that the dominant Judeo-Christian morality of
Nietzsche’s day was the product of a “slave-revolt in morality” fueled by the resentment
which the weak felt toward the powerful).
17. See, e.g., Chris Ford, The Racist Origins of Private School Vouchers, THE CENTER
FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (July 12, 2017, 11:59 PM), https://www.americanprogress.org
/issues/education-k-12/reports/2017/07/12/435629/racist-origins-private-school-vouchers/);
Alyssa Pagano, The Racist Origins of Marijuana Prohibition, BUSINESS INSIDER (March 2,
2018, 9:57 AM) , https://www.businessinsider.com/racist-origins-marijuana-prohibitionlegalization-2018-2).
18. The 1619 Project, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2019 magazine, at 40, 55, 72.
19. Simon Blackburn, Pragmatism in Philosophy: The Hidden Alternative, 41 PHIL.
EXCH. 1, 4 (2011) (observing that what he calls “pragmatist” explanations “may be offered
in an unmasking, debunking spirit, as in Nietzsche or Foucault. We think some particular
way, they say, only because we are flawed: weak, or slavish, or corrupt, or chained by
distorting social and economic forces. But pragmatist explanations may also be offered in
a perfectly friendly, perhaps even ‘bunking’ spirit.”).
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topic precisely in order to suggest that some broad principle (e.g.,
the separation of powers) or some particular legal mechanism
(e.g., impeachment) demands our special regard today. 20 These
suggestions, too, trade on the genetic fallacy, though in the
opposite direction. It is “esteem by association.”
But the question is, however pervasive such arguments may
be, are they rational? That is, is the genetic fallacy really a fallacy?
This Essay offers a partial answer to that question. It is partial
because it temporarily brackets the question of whether such
arguments are, as a general matter, rational for all-thingsconsidered normative evaluation of some practice.21 My own view
is that it is not a fallacy. People often seem to care about history—
both of their own beliefs and of the social, political, or the
economic practices they approve or disapprove of, join, oppose,
or ignore—and I think they are right to do so. I’ll say a bit more
about why that is in the Conclusion, but the bulk of this Essay
focuses on the narrower question of whether such historical
explanations are relevant to the sorts of arguments that lawyers
and judges make in the context of adjudication. In other words, it
takes stock of the role of genetic inferences in the context of legal
reasoning.
My answer to that question is that under at least three models
of legal reasoning, such explanations are properly relevant, in
theory, to the legal analysis (i.e., the charge of fallacious reasoning
is misplaced). These three models are: reasoning from authority,

20. Of course, sometimes reference to the Founders is made on the ground that their
views are evidence of the law at the time, which is what binds current judges (unless the
law has been duly changed). See, e.g., William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Grounding
Originalism, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1455 (2019) (endorsing a view they call “original-law
originalism,” which serves as the “criterion for the rest of our constitutional law, ‘including
of the validity of other methods of interpretation or decision.’”) (quoting William Baude,
Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2355 (2015)). Even so, it may be that
part of the reason we look to the Founders’ law is that we treat them with a certain
reverence. See SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 351 (2011) (“The reverence in which the
‘Founding Fathers’ are held . . . and the veneration with which the text is treated all
bespeak a belief that the authority of the Constitution stems from its special provenance.”).
21. There is a vast philosophical literature on this and related questions. For a few
recent examples, see Katia Vavova, Irrelevant Influences, 96 PHIL. & PHENOM. RESEARCH
134 (2018); David Plunkett, Conceptual History, Conceptual Ethics, and the Aims of
Inquiry: A Framework for Thinking about the Relevance the History/Genealogy of
Concepts to Normative Inquiry, 3 ERGO 27 (2016); Roger White, You Just Believe that
Because . . . , 24 PHIL. PERSPECTIVES 573 (2010). For some older entries, see Margaret A.
Crouch, A “Limited” Defense of the Genetic Fallacy, 24 METAPHILOSOPHY 227 (1993);
Hanson, supra note 1; Goudge, supra note 1.
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reasoning for the sake of integrity, and a third form of reasoning
that I call, following the philosopher Charles Taylor, ad hominem
reasoning. 22 Under each of these ways of drawing inferences
about and from legal materials, the question of how those
materials came into existence matters for assessing their presentday legal status.
Because this third, “ad hominem,” form of reasoning is the
least familiar, and because I have discussed the first two models
at greater length elsewhere, 23 I devote the most attention to
identifying and explaining this third model. What I hope to show
is that ad hominem argumentation best fits the traditional idea
that the common law “works itself pure” over time and, relatedly,
that it best explains the appeal of a “Living Constitution,” whose
meaning evolves over time.24 I explain what I mean by both terms
and support my claim about the latter by showing how one of the
most famous and controversial Supreme Court cases of the last
few decades, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, exemplifies this model of reasoning.
I. REASONING FROM AUTHORITY
Reasoning from authority is the model of reasoning that is
both the most commonly used in legal argument and the model
under which historical explanations are the most obviously
relevant. As traditionally formulated, to treat some source as
authoritative entails treating the mere fact that the source stated
a proposition or issued a directive as itself a reason to believe that
proposition (in the case of theoretical authority) or follow that

22. See Charles Taylor, Explanation and Practical Reasoning, in CHARLES TAYLOR,
PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS (1995). What are typically known as “Ad hominem
arguments,” i.e., those directed at the person making an argument rather than the
argument itself, are also considered fallacious. But Taylor gives this term a technical
meaning which is distinct from, though related, to that more conventional understanding.
See infra note 23, Part III. A.
23. See Charles L. Barzun, Impeaching Precedent, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1625 (2013).
24. The phrase may be traced back to Lord Mansfield. See Omychund v. Barker, 26
ENG. REP. 15, 23 (Ch. 1744) (Mansfield, L.J.) (“[T]he common law, that works itself pure
by rules drawn from the fountain of justice, is for this reason superior to an act of
parliament.”). But it was made more famous in this country by Lon Fuller’s invocation of
it. LON L. FULLER, LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 140 (1940) (concluding his book with the
observation that the common-law judge “is playing his part in the eternal process by which
the common law works itself pure and adapts itself to the needs of a new day”). On living
constitutionalism, see DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) (offering a
theory of constitutional interpretation based on the common law method of adjudication).
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directive (in the case of practical authority). 25 In this way,
authorities provide people with “content-independent” reasons
for belief or action.26 In such circumstances, whether deference to
an authority’s judgment is justified in any particular case will
depend in part on how and why the authority is issuing the
directive or stating the proposition.
A simple example illustrates the point. Most of us treat
medical doctors who attend to us as authorities with respect to our
physical health. So if your doctor recommends a course of
treatment, you generally count that as a reason—even if not
always a conclusive reason—to pursue that course of treatment.
But you do so on the assumption that the best explanation for the
doctor’s recommendation is that she genuinely believes it to be
the best course of treatment, based on her knowledge and
experience. If you have reason to think that the reasoning
supporting that recommendation was biased or distorted in some
way—perhaps because she stands to benefit financially or in some
other way from your use of the treatment—then you will likely be
less inclined to follow her recommendation. Those are precisely
the situations in which one seeks a second opinion (from another
authority).
Something similar occurs in law. Such traditional sources of
law as judicial opinions, statutes, and constitutions are treated as
legal “authorities” because judges and other officials treat the
directives they contain as providing them with sufficient reasons
to render decisions consistent with those directives.27 Here, too,

25. See Scott J. Shapiro, Authority, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 382, 400 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds.,
2002) (observing, in the context of epistemic or “theoretical” authority, that such
authorities are legitimate when “their directives are also conclusive reasons to believe that
their content is justified”).
26. FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING 62 (2009) (explaining that for directives to be treated as
“authoritative” means that their force derives “not from their soundness but from their
status, and philosophers of law refer to this feature of authority as contentindependence.”).
27. Id. This point is limited to situations where courts treat such sources as genuinely
authoritative, rather than as merely “persuasive” authority, such as a court decision from
another jurisdiction or the constitution of another country. In such cases, presumably the
court is only endorsing the force of the reasoning the source reflects or embodies, rather
than treating its existence as itself a reason to follow it. For that reason, as Professor
Schauer has pointed out, the term “persuasive authority” seems be nearly a contradiction
in terms. See id. at 69 (explaining that “if the court citing such material is genuinely
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the explanation of how a source became such an authority
matters. If a bill did not receive a majority of votes in support of
it, or an administrative order was not properly authorized by the
executive, then courts will no longer treat it as authoritative. This
concern with the “pedigree” of a rule is well recognized by legal
scholars and is associated with the tradition of legal positivism.28
It will immediately be objected that what is going on here is
very different than what is going on in the doctor case. There the
explanation for why the doctor gave the recommendation she did
mattered for the purposes of determining its truth. We worry that
bias may have led to an inaccurate evaluation of what curing your
ailment requires. But in the case of legal sources, we do not care
about the explanation of how the directive came to be because we
have concerns about its truth or accuracy. Rather, we care about
the process because it is simply what makes law by converting
some rule into a legally valid one. In philosophical jargon, the
relation between the historical explanation and the proffered
authority is metaphysical, rather than epistemic. In that way, it
differs fundamentally from the doctor case.
There are a few things to say about this objection. First, it
seems unlikely to fit all the instances of deference to legal
authorities. When courts defer to past court decisions, for
instance, they may sometimes do so on the ground that the past
decision is likely to be rightly decided, not because it was duly
authorized by the relevant criteria of legal validity.29 Admittedly,
this explanation for the practice of stare decisis is not the most
popular one these days. But its plausibility is increased
persuaded, then it is misleading to think of the sources as authoritative at all, for persuasion
and authority are fundamentally opposed notions.”).
28. Whether that’s a fair characterization of legal positivism is controversial.
Compare Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 17 (1967)
(ascribing to legal positivism the view that the “law of a community is a set of special rules
used by the community directly or indirectly for the purpose of determining which
behavior will be punished or coerced by the public power” and that such rules “can be
identified and distinguished by specific criteria, by tests having to do not with their content
but with their pedigree or the manner in which they were adopted or developed”)
(emphasis in original) with H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 264 (3d ed.) (2011)
(arguing that Dworkin’s belief that “a rule of recognition can only provide pedigree
criteria” is mistaken).
29. RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION: TOWARD A THEORY OF
LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 43 (1961) (ascribing to the jurist John W. Salmond the view that
past cases are presumed to be correct); John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the
Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L. J. 503, 512 (2000) (“Precedent means that prior decisions
are taken as correct, or correct unless shown otherwise to some requisite degree.”).
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considerably if part of the value of stare decisis is that it conserves
judicial resources by allowing judges to avoid rethinking every
issue they confront.30
If judges do defer to past decisions for this reason, then the
historical explanation of how or why it came to be decided in the
way that it did does seem relevant to assessing its value as an
authority in a way analogous to our concern with the explanation
for the doctor’s recommendation to her patient. It is interesting,
then, that judges seem only to care about explanations in one
direction: they frequently look to the reasons a past court offered
in support of its decision as an explanation of that decision, but
they rarely (though not never) offer explanations purporting to
show that the past court was corrupted or biased in some way in
order to show that the past court’s decision ought not be trusted.
They offer bunking accounts of precedents, in other words, but
not debunking ones. I have explained and criticized that
asymmetry elsewhere, but I put that issue aside for now.31
The second point is that in many cases where courts do look
to a proffered source’s pedigree as an explanation for its
authoritativeness it often does so for reasons of political morality.
Statutes are the best example here. The reason why we demand
that a bill receive majority support in the legislature before it
becomes law is that we think that process ensures a certain
democratic legitimacy. This situation still differs from the doctor
case, for we are not looking to the historical explanation in order
to help us evaluate the “accuracy” or “truth” of the content of the
bill. The historical explanation of the source matters for moral,
rather than epistemic reasons. Still, the structure of reasoning is
the same. In both cases, the historical process serves to validate
(morally or epistemically) the rules that are produced as outputs
of that process; and in both cases, there’s an underlying rationale

30. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149
(Yale 1921) (“[T]he labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if
every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one’s own
course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before
him.”); See also, Schauer, Thinking, supra note 26, at 43 (observing that “stare decisis
brings the advantages of cognitive and decisional efficiency”).
31. Barzun, Impeaching, supra note 23, at 1625 (offering Justice Souter’s dissent in
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), as a rare example of a judge
reasoning in the way described in the text and providing an explanation and defense of
that sort of reasoning).
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for the process that provides a criterion for determining whether
or not the process has worked well in any particular case.
An example may help here. Take the “absurdity” doctrine of
statutory interpretation. In theory, ratification of a text through
the proper procedures—in the case of federal legislation, Article
I’s requirements of bicameralism and presentment—is both
necessary and sufficient to convert that text into law. Period. But
even most textualists—who emphasize the significance of those
procedures in delimiting the interpreter’s task—carve out an
exception for clerical errors that would, if read literally, have an
“absurd” result. In so doing, they implicitly acknowledge the
importance of capturing something like legislative “intent.”32 In
other words, because the rationale for requiring the procedures in
the first place is to facilitate democratic lawmaking, deviations
from those procedures are sometimes allowed when doing so
seems consistent with that same underlying democratic rationale.
Finally, though, it must be acknowledged that the objection
is successful under one rationale for treating the directives of
some source as authoritative. Sometimes judges treat legal
sources as authorities simply because other judges do so as well.33
Philosophers dub such rules conventional rules, the benefits of
which lie in their capacity to facilitate coordination among
different people and institutions.34 If all legal sources were treated
as authoritative only for this reason, then arguments that look to
the origins of some source would indeed commit a “fallacy”
because nothing about how the source came to be would matter
for the purpose of deciding the issue. To see why, consider the
paradigmatic conventional rule: the rule instructing us to drive on
the right side of the road. That other drivers drive on the right side
today provides you with a reason to do so as well, never mind how
that practice developed or why those who first initiated it did so.
Under this rationale, all that matters is that the source is treated

32. See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is that English You’re Speaking?”:
Why Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 978–79
(2004) (arguing that such textualists as Justice Scalia and Professor Manning cannot justify
the use of the absurdity doctrine on the basis of what Alexander and Prakash call
“Intention Free Textualism”).
33. Famously, H.L.A. Hart argued that the ultimate rule of recognition of a legal
system was a conventional rule. See HART, supra note 28, at 256; Leslie Green,
Introduction, id. at xxii.
34. See Gerald J. Postema, Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law,
11 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1982).
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as law by others tasked with enforcing it today. It seems unlikely,
though, that all law is founded upon this rationale.35
II. REASONING FOR THE SAKE OF INTEGRITY
Another rationale sometimes offered for the law’s concern
with history is one that sounds in the political virtue of integrity.36
When we praise a person for her integrity we typically mean that
she has stuck to her principles over time rather than shifting her
views according to what suits her interests or popular fashions at
the moment. 37 Perhaps the law aims for a certain degree of
consistency, both across different areas of law and over time, for
a similar reason: the law should be a forum of principle, rather
than politics.38
Reasoning for the sake of integrity, unlike reasoning from
authority, is not entirely content-independent because having
integrity demands some minimum threshold of moral adequacy.39
35. Green, supra note 33 (“It is not plausible to think that the only reason officials
conform to a rule of recognition (or other fundamental rules) is that others do so.”).
36. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 165–66 (1986) (describing and endorsing
an ideal of “integrity” that “requires government to speak with one voice, to act in a
principled and coherent manner toward all its citizens, to extend to everyone the
substantive standards of justice or fairness it uses for some”); Gerald J. Postema, On the
Moral Presence of Our Past, 36 MCGILL L.J. 1153, 1177 (1991) (“Integrity in a community
takes the form of an ideal of equality, not the formal or abstract equality of treating like
cases alike, but substantive equality, equality among members in recognition of their comembership.”).
37. The many eulogies praising John McCain’s “integrity” after the late Senator’s
death seem to have something like this idea in mind. See, e.g., Leonard Pitts, Jr., John
McCain: A Man of Integrity and Honor, BALTIMORE SUN (Aug. 30, 2018, 6:00 AM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-op-0830-pitts-mccain-20180829story.html (“Most of us can only imagine the difficulty of balancing politics and integrity.
McCain likely managed it as well as anyone ever could.”); Michael Bloomberg, John
McCain: American Hero, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 25, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/view
/articles/2018-08-26/michael-bloomberg-s-tribute-to-john-mccain-american-hero
(observing that McCain “never sacrificed his integrity or honor . . . for the sake of personal
or political gain”).
38. Dworkin, supra note 36, at 172 (cited in note 86) (explaining that his theory of
law as integrity “assumes that the community can adopt and express and be faithful or
unfaithful to principles of its own, distinct from those of any of its officials or citizens as
individuals”); Postema, supra note 35, at 1176 (“If we, in and through the communities we
constitute, are to deliberate and act purposively and responsibly in time, we must be able
to see our common actions as fitting into meaningful patterns and practices through
time.”).
39. Scott Hershovitz, Integrity and Stare Decisis, in EXPLORING LAW’S EMPIRE: THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF RONALD DWORKIN 114 (Scott Hershovitz, ed., 2006) (observing that
one acts with integrity when one’s “actions as a whole reflect a commitment to a coherent
and defensible moral view”).
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A Nazi cannot have integrity. That means that when deciding
whether a past rule should govern a present case, a judge must to
some degree consider the moral quality of the rule. Thus, the
historical explanation of how a given source came to be treated as
law does not figure in the analysis in quite the same way as when
courts look to the pedigree of a source or defer to one on
epistemic grounds.
Nevertheless, even here, historical explanations do, or
should, matter. 40 The reason is straightforward: for a person to
have integrity with respect to some domain of action or belief she
must make her decisions, or form her beliefs, on the basis of
general principles that apply outside the immediate context of
decision. That is why “being principled” is synonymous with
having integrity. Since the process by which a person reaches her
conclusion matters for the sake of integrity (i.e., it must be based
on principles), an explanation for her decision that does not
involve the application of those principles would undermine that
decision from the perspective of integrity. And the same, it seems,
would be true of law.
An example demonstrates the point. In the landmark case of
Dillon v. Legg, the Supreme Court of California faced the
question of whether a plaintiff could recover for the emotional
harm she suffered from witnessing the defendant’s car run into,
and kill, her daughter, as she was crossing the street. 41 The
defendant had argued that the defendant owed the plaintiff no
duty to avoid such harm because the plaintiff failed to show that
she was in the “zone of danger” at the time of the accident, as the
law required at the time. In responding to this argument, the court
observed that “the history of the concept of duty discloses that it
is not an old and deep-rooted doctrine but a legal device of the
latter half of the nineteenth century designed to curtail the feared
propensities of juries toward liberal awards.”42 The implication of
the reasoning was that, had the concept of duty indeed been an
“old and deep-rooted doctrine,” then it may have carried more
normative weight. But since it was merely a “legal device of the
latter half of the nineteenth century,” used primarily for reasons
of judicial policy, it demanded little fidelity from the court today.
40. I have made this argument in the context of stare decisis elsewhere. Barzun,
Impeaching, supra note 23, at 1652–54.
41. Dillon v. Legg, 68 CAL. 2D 728 (1968).
42. Id. at 734.
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Because the doctrine did not flow from principle, it did not
command the court’s adherence. 43 Thus, how and why the rule
came into existence mattered for the purpose of determining its
continuing vitality.
III. AD HOMINEM ARGUMENTATION
The last model of legal reasoning that makes historical
explanations relevant to legal argument is the least well-known
but the most interesting. Indeed, it has not, as far as I know, been
recognized as a distinct model of legal reasoning.44 The burden of
this Part is thus twofold: first, to explain and identify what this
model of practical reasoning entails generally; second, to show
how it can be seen as a distinct model of legal reasoning. My
ultimate claim—that historical explanations are relevant to the
analysis under this model of reasoning—will be established in the
course of meeting this twofold burden. For as will become clear,
it is a form of reasoning in which historical explanations figure
centrally.
A. AD HOMINEM ARGUMENTS AS A FORM OF PRACTICAL
REASONING

The third model of practical and legal reasoning I call “ad
hominem” reasoning. The term comes from Charles Taylor, who
is the first philosopher (as far as I know) to have identified it as a
distinct form of reasoning worthy of its own name. Born in 1931,
Taylor is an eminent Canadian political and moral philosopher
whose work broadly falls within the “hermeneutic” tradition of
philosophy, which sees knowledge as fundamentally dependent
on human meaning and interpretation. Taylor’s philosophical
influences are diverse and include Hegel, Wittgenstein, HansGeorge Gadamer, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
Taylor explores the role of ad hominem arguments in an
essay entitled Explanation and Practical Reason.45 In this Section,
I summarize his analysis of ad hominem reasoning in that essay in
some detail because it will lay the foundation for my analysis of it
in the legal context.
43. Note that one could also see this as reasoning from authority, where the oldness
and deep-rootedness counted in favor of its correctness.
44. As I explain in the text, Charles Taylor has identified and defended ad hominem
argumentation as a legitimate form of practical reasoning more generally.
45. Taylor, Explanation, supra note 22.
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Taylor uses the term “ad hominem” because this form of
reasoning involves arguing for a particular view by comparing it
directly to another person’s view or theory, rather than by
showing that the theory beats all comers.46 His goal is to offer ad
hominem argumentation as an alternative to what he calls the
“apodeictic” or deductive model of reasoning, which requires the
application of general criteria to specific cases. 47 More
specifically, he is chiefly concerned with responding to a form of
moral relativism that denies the possibility of adjudicating crosscultural value conflicts on the ground that people in different
cultures disagree about first principles, making rational resolution
of conflicts over controversial practices impossible.
Against this view, Taylor argues that if you look at the
arguments people actually make on behalf of what we take to be
immoral practices, they usually do not so much reject
fundamental moral principles as they do try to explain why those
principles do not apply in a particular case. For instance, even
Nazis would often pay lip service to the intrinsic value of human
life, Taylor suggests, but they argued that the targets of their
persecution and murder were, for one reason or another, not fully
human or that they posed a unique threat to the community.48 In
other words, defenders of immoral practices often recognize the
moral principles with which their conduct conflicts, but they try to
rationalize their behavior through some sort of “special plea.”49
If that description of moral disagreement is accurate, then,
according to Taylor, arguing with someone may begin from
shared premises even if that person is from another culture with
seemingly radically different moral practices. One assumes that
one’s opponent understands what is good and right but that she
has fallen into moral error—error which results “from confusion,
unclarity, or an unwillingness to face some of what he cannot
lucidly repudiate.” 50 And the goal of arguing with them is to
“show up the special pleas.”51
46. Id. at 54.
47. Id. at 36. Lawyers would call the apodeictic model of reasoning a “syllogism.”
When such criteria are found in a positive legal source, such as a statute or court decision,
the deductive or apodeictic model of reasoning fits what I called reasoning by authority.
When those criteria are moral principles, they better fit reasoning for the sake of integrity.
48. Id. at 35.
49. Id. at 36.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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Because, under this view, persuading a person to change her
moral view is really an effort to increase her own selfunderstanding, the appropriate form of reasoning is not the
deductive, apodeictic sort. Instead, it requires ad hominem
argumentation, which accepts for the sake of argument what one’s
opponent already believes and compares it against one’s own
views. The central task of such an argument is to show why
moving from your opponent’s views to your own results in what
Taylor calls a “gain in understanding” or an “epistemic gain.”52
That is, the purpose is to show your opponent why she can
improve her epistemic position by adopting your view.
Taylor’s point, of course, is not that, as an empirical matter,
one could (or should even try to) persuade actual Nazis to
abandon their barbaric views through the use of ad hominem
argumentation. The point is instead one about the structure of
reasoning: deep moral disagreement does not necessarily reduce
to a situation of dueling, incompatible first premises because ad
hominem arguments reject the apodeictic model’s demand for
“criteria.”53 Rather than asking whether one moral view satisfies
some independent criterion better than does another view, they
look to the process by which one view came to replace an earlier
one in order to determine whether an epistemic gain has been
achieved.54 If that transition occurred through an error-reducing
process, then we have reason to trust that subsequent view, at
least relative to what it replaced.
Taylor offers a few examples to show what he has in mind.
Imagine you walk into a classroom and see a pink elephant. You
literally can’t believe your eyes. So you rub your eyes, shake your
head, and then look more carefully. It’s still there. Now you
believe that there really is a pink elephant in the room, no matter
how surprising that is. So you seek out explanations, e.g., that
someone has played a practical joke.55 You are more confident in
your belief that there is a pink elephant in the room because you
52. Id. at 42, 59. Taylor credits this focus on transitions that count as epistemic gains
to Alasdair MacIntyre, Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of
Science, 60 MONIST 453 (1977).
53. The version of ad hominem argumentation discussed in the text is the third of
three versions Taylor describes. Taylor considers it the most radical of the three because
it rejects more wholeheartedly than the other two the apodeictic model of reasoning. Id.
at 42–43.
54. Id. at 51.
55. Id. at 52.
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have taken error-reducing measures, namely ensuring that you’re
not dreaming, that your eyes are working, and that you’re giving
sufficient cognitive attention to the matter. Such an “ameliorating
transition” gives you increased confidence in your new belief.56
So far, so good. But Taylor’s second and third examples are
a bit trickier. He first takes the case of Joe, who is unsure whether
he loves Anne or not because he also resents her, and he thinks
the two emotions are incompatible. Later he realizes that the two
emotions are distinct and not incompatible and so concludes that
he does love her. According to Taylor, Joe is confident in this
second judgment “because he knows that he passed from one to
the other via the clarification of a confusion, i.e., a move which in
its very nature is error-reducing.”57
Taylor then offers the case of Pete, who is a child who used
to act horribly at home. He always felt himself somehow cheated
and treated his younger siblings poorly. Eventually, though, after
several sessions with a social worker his parents hired, he comes
to recognize that he felt entitled to certain things because he was
the oldest. Now he rejects any such principle and so repudiates his
earlier behavior. According to Taylor, Pete has undergone moral
change and is “confident that this change represents moral
growth, because it came about, through dissipating a confused,
largely unconsciously held belief, one which couldn’t survive his
recognizing its real nature.”58
Taylor recognizes that each of these examples involved
changes made by a single person about his own beliefs, but he
insists that the same thing occurs in arguments and dialogues
between individuals. Indeed, Taylor concludes that this form of
argument is “the commonest form of practical reasoning in our
lives.” 59 It involves proposing to our interlocutors “transitions
mediated by such error-reducing moves, by the identification of
contradiction, the dissipation of confusion, or by rescuing from
(usually motivated) neglect a consideration whose significance
they cannot contest.”60 That is, A seeks to show why B can make
an epistemic gain by coming around to A’s view of the matter.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 53.
Id.
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In short, according to Taylor, ad hominem argumentation
involves an effort to persuade someone of something by showing
them that they are not seeing the matter clearly or that their moral
judgment has been in some way corrupted. In that way, historical
explanations as to why a person has come to hold a particular view
are critical. There is, however, a further step in this reasoning
process that Taylor either ignores or does not bring out with
sufficient clarity. To see what that step is, let us take a closer look
at his three examples.
There is a crucial difference between the first example (pink
elephant) and the latter two. In the first example, we conclude
that we have achieved an epistemic gain because we have
independent reasons for thinking that the measures taken were
error-reducing. We rub our eyes, for instance, because we have
done that on other occasions and noticed that it has corrected
misperceptions. In the latter two examples, however, there is no
comparable independent basis for concluding that the transition
described—Joe’s coming to conclude he really does love Anne,
Pete’s coming to see his earlier behavior as unjustified—were
error-reducing, thereby justifying the conclusion that the change
marked an “epistemic gain.” Instead, the judgment that the
earlier view resulted from a (motivated) “neglected
consideration” or was “confused” seems entirely based on the
firmness of Joe’s and Pete’s current convictions that their
subsequent views on the matter at hand are the correct ones. And
yet it is precisely the validity of those convictions that the process
is meant to affirm. Thus, the argument seems to collapse into
circularity.
Imagine, for instance, a transition whereby Pete comes to
conclude that his younger siblings have been manipulated by his
father in ways designed to humiliate and belittle him. The effect
is to reinforce and deepen his sense of indignation at having been
wronged rather than to alleviate it. Could Pete not just as well
conclude, from his later vantage point, that he had neglected a
relevant consideration, namely his father’s nefarious role in his
conflicts with his siblings? If so, on what basis could we justify
treating the transition Taylor describes as an epistemic gain and
the one I have described as an epistemic loss?
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The answer, which I think is implicit in Taylor’s argument in
that essay (and more explicit elsewhere 61 , begins with the
recognition that there is no general criterion by which we can
judge one transition to be a gain and another not. Instead, we
must look to the particular facts of the case and try to assess
whether the transition counts as a gain by reflecting on both (a)
the force of one’s convictions about the matter at hand and (b)
the plausibility of alternative explanations of how one came to
that belief other than having come to see the force of those moral
truths after having neglected them earlier.
Consider again the story of Pete. In Taylor’s version, in order
for Pete to know whether he should act on the basis of his new
moral view—that he is not entitled to more than his siblings
simply by virtue of being the first born—he must compare it
against other possible explanations of how he came to adopt this
new view, such as, for instance, that he has been duped by the
social worker his parents hired into giving up his claim to what is
rightfully his. And the same is true of my twist on the story in
which Pete ends up blaming his father for his plight. He must
compare the force of his newfound conviction about his father’s
manipulative role (by looking to any evidence of such a
manipulation that may exist) against alternative explanations as
to why he has developed this view—such as, for instance, that he
already resented his father for other reasons, which clouded his
judgment.
If we generalize from the case of evaluating one’s own
conduct, beliefs, or attitudes to the case of evaluating an entire
social or political practice, a similar reasoning applies. Following
Taylor, we might say that the “best account” one can give of such
a practice is one that compares the best justification the practice
can offer on its own terms to possible explanations of its
dominance or acceptance other than an explanation that looks to
its intrinsic appeal or truth.62
61. I think Taylor has in mind something like what I argue in the text in CHARLES
TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 57 (1989) (“What better measure of reality do we have in
human affairs than those terms which on critical reflection and after correction of the
errors we can detect make the best sense of our lives? ‘Making the best sense’ here includes
not only offering the best, most realistic orientation about the good but also allowing us
best to understand and make sense of the actions and feelings of ourselves and others.”)
(emphasis added).
62. Professor Klement seems to have in mind something similar when he describes
what he calls “self-referential abductive arguments.” See Klement, supra note 1, at 390
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The method is analogous to, but importantly different from,
the method of “reflective equilibrium” made famous by John
Rawls.63 Under that approach to moral reasoning one compares
one’s considered judgments about particular cases with the
fundamental principles to which one is committed, allowing each
type of consideration to influence the other.64 The ad hominem
form of reasoning described here, however, compares one’s
settled moral convictions about some practice (whether arrived at
by reflective equilibrium or some other process) against rival
explanations of how that practice may have developed—other
than as a result of its truth or intrinsic appeal. The reason it looks
to explanations is that the goal is not to identify and refine the
proper criteria for moral evaluation (as in the case of reflective
equilibrium), but rather to assess whether the adoption of that
practice marked an epistemic gain or loss over what it revised or
replaced. If so, then that fact counts in favor of the practice. In
this way, the historical explanation of a practice is relevant to an
assessment of its present value.
Another way to put the point is that, under this view, the
justification for a practice is a sort of explanation. 65 Since it
requires evaluating practices by looking to the transitions which
led to it, to say that a practice embodies a certain value or
(explaining that such arguments “begin only with the presence of a certain belief held by
some person or some group of people, and proceed to argue that the very belief in question
must be true simply because the best explanation as to why that belief exists entails that
the belief is true or probably true.”). Professor Klement goes on to observe that, in his
view, such arguments “have been unduly neglected by philosophers and logicians, and that
they are more common, and more important, than one might think.” Id. In my view, the
same is true of legal philosophers and theorists.
63. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48–53 (1971).
64. Id. at 48–53; Norman Daniels, Reflective Equilibrium, in THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2013), https://plato.stanford.edu
/entries/reflective-equilibrium/ (“The method of reflective equilibrium consists in working
back and forth among our considered judgments (some say our ‘intuitions,’ though Rawls
(1971), the namer of the method, avoided the term ‘intuitions’ in this context) about
particular instances or cases, the principles or rules that we believe govern them, and the
theoretical considerations that we believe bear on accepting these considered judgments,
principles, or rules, revising any of these elements wherever necessary in order to achieve
an acceptable coherence among them.”).
65. It is interesting, in this regard to notice the etymological connection between the
words “cause” and “because.” See Selim Berker, The Unity of Grounding, 127 MIND 729,
733 (2018) (“It takes real work to remind ourselves that ‘virtue’ is part of ‘in virtue of’ and
that ‘cause’ is part of ‘because’.”). Cf. Nicholas St. John Green, Proximate and Remote
Cause, 4 AM. L. REV. 201 (1869) (observing that Bacon “uses the word cause in the broad
signification which it has in the writings of Aristotle and his commentators the schoolmen,
that is, as nearly synonymous with the word reason”).

02 BARZUN_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

448

12/23/2019 10:39 AM

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 34:429

expresses important truths is implicitly to make a claim about the
epistemic quality of the transition that led to its current
incarnation. Specifically, it entails making a claim that the truth
value of the propositions embodied in the practice is at least partly
what explains its current acceptance. If we did not think that the
truth played any such role—if, for instance, we thought the
practice could be entirely explained as the result of social or
economic forces unrelated to the truth value of its constituent
claims—we would have no reason to think that an epistemic gain
took place at all.
B. AD HOMINEM ARGUMENTATION AS A MODEL OF LEGAL
REASONING
Does ad hominem reasoning serve as a model of reasoning in
law and legal argument? I think it does. For starters, it is worth
observing that at a very general level, the ad hominem method of
reasoning is concerned with process in a sense familiar to lawyers.
The legal system is riddled with procedures that are designed to
reduce errors and whose outcomes we often assume (or at least
hope) produce epistemic gains. Everything from the rules
governing discovery and the admissibility of evidence to the
adversarial structure of trial and appellate argument can be seen
as efforts to generate “epistemic gains” in our understanding of
which alleged rights violations are entitled to repair and which are
not. That courts are constantly forced to resolve factual and legal
issues by making essentially comparative judgments in the way ad
hominem argument entails only reinforces the point.
But the harder question is whether the particular sort of
reasoning Taylor describes plays a role in legal argument and
analysis. In support of the claim that it does I offer two distinct
(but related) pieces of evidence. The first involves showing that
ad hominem reasoning captures better than does its rival models
of reasoning (discussed above) one traditional, if controversial,
justification for common-law decisionmaking, namely the idea
that the common law “works itself pure” over time. The second
piece of evidence is the fact that in one famous and important
case, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
the Supreme Court engaged explicitly in ad hominem reasoning,
albeit not under that label.
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i. The common law as a series of epistemic gains
The suggestion that the common law “works itself pure” over
time expresses the idea that by developing doctrines through a
process of deciding particular, concrete cases, common-law judges
feel their way to better and better rules—at least better in the
sense of better suited to the demands of the time. It is a process
of evolution, even if only a partially conscious one.66
This justification does not fit any of the other models we have
considered particularly well. It does not presume that past
decisions are necessarily right and for that reason command
courts’ obedience, as reasoning from authority would require. To
the contrary, it suggests that the common law’s virtue as a source
of law lies precisely in the fact that its doctrines change and
improve over time. But nor does the notion of “integrity” quite
capture it. The process is one of improving, refining, and adapting,
not one that demands fidelity to fixed principles. Finally, for much
the same reason, this understanding does not see past decisions as
conclusively binding present courts purely as a matter of
convention. After all, the whole point is that the rules change,
whereas conventions are valuable insofar as they prevent change
and reduce uncertainty.
The ad hominem model of reasoning, by contrast, captures
well the idea that the law “works itself pure.” It explains, for
instance, why common-law courts look first to the rules and
rationales offered by previous courts but nevertheless consider
themselves free to revise those rules and to find new bases for
distinguishing past cases. 67 Like the epistemic rational for
66. Or perhaps an entirely unconscious one. Another explanation for the same
phenomenon, understood in economic terms, is the thesis that the common law develops
efficient rules because inefficient rules are more likely to be litigated. The literature here
is vast, but for classic statements, see George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the
Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977) and Paul H. Rubin, Why is the
Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 51 (1977). But see Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in
the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 Geo. L.J. 583 (1992) (criticizing the efficiency hypothesis
on the ground that the cases judges decide are subject to selection bias). Even though this
explanation does not in any way depend on judges having an intuitive sense of which rules
are efficient or not, as long as it asserts that the process is one that produces good rules (in
this case, defined in terms of efficiency), such an explanation could perform the same
function in ad hominem argumentation as the more traditional rationale for the commonlaw method. The reason is that the explanation purports to track the truth (of what is a
good rule) in an analogous way.
67. Schauer, Thinking, supra note 26, at 105–06 (arguing that the image of the
common law conveyed by Mansfield and Fuller’s formulation has “no real-world
instantiations,” but acknowledging that “although the image of an entirely judge-made
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reasoning by authority, it treats the truth-value of the doctrines
(i.e., their moral fitness for resolving the issue at hand) as the
driving factor in explaining how they came to be treated as legal
authorities. But like the integrity model, it asks judges to engage
substantively with the reasoning of those cases, not just to defer
to them for reasons of coordination or democratic legitimacy.68
That is why they feel free to refine and alter those doctrines when
the facts with which they are presented seem to demand it.69
In short, under this view, the common law is itself a series of
“epistemic gains,” in Taylor’s sense. The role envisioned for the
common-law judge is in some ways analogous to that of a natural
scientist. Like the scientist, the judge must make her own fresh
judgments about what the right outcome in the particular case is
while at the same time considering the vast amount of background
material already produced by others working in the field (i.e., past
judges). Insofar as she relies on those background materials, she
does so because she trusts the process that she assumes has
produced them. In this way, the ad hominem nature of her
reasoning is implicit in how she uses and interprets past decisions.
To all of this one may be inclined to make the following sort
of objection: what is described above hardly qualifies as a
“justification” for the common law at all; it is an obscuring myth,
and a harmful one at that. Far from feeling their way towards
better and better rules in a process of moral or social
improvement, common-law courts have instead been simply
entrenching—and then discarding whenever it suits them—“the
assumptions of a dominant class,” as Holmes put it. 70 This is
essentially Morton Horwitz’s claim in The Transformation of
American Law, and, as noted above, a whole generation of critical
legal theorists and historians made comparable points about
different areas of the law. 71 Whereas an earlier generation had
common law is a caricature, it captures important features of adjudication in common-law
countries,” such as the judge’s ability to refine and reinterpret past cases and even
statutes).
68. Cf. Hershovitz, supra note 39, at 116 (“There is good reason to think of stare
decisis as a broader practice than simply following precedent . . . Overruling and
distinguishing are as much ways of engaging with the past as following is.”).
69. See Schauer, Thinking, supra note 26, at 118–19 (questioning whether commonlaw rules even qualify as “law” given how easily judges may revise prior rules when their
application entails what the judge considers suboptimal implications or consequences).
70. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 1 BOS. L. SCHOOL MAG. 10 (1897).
71. See HORWITZ, supra note 15 (arguing that in the nineteenth century commonlaw judges refashioned tort and contract doctrines in order to subsidize burgeoning
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seen law in general, and the common law especially, as a process
of development and progress, they saw mainly the work of
ideology.72 In their view, the ideas and ideals associated with legal
practice and liberal political theory—individual rights, the “rule
of law,” notions of judicial impartiality and the like—were really
instruments by which powerful interests oppressed weaker
segments of society. These interests have mischaracterized the
current political structure as a “neutral” one in order to legitimate
their own power, rather than seeing it for what it is—the product
of a naked struggle for power.73
Maybe so. But that’s just the point. This critique does not
undermine the role historical explanation plays in ad hominem
argumentation; quite the opposite, it is yet another example of it.
For the logic of the CLS critique is just the inverse of the workingitself-pure idea: the best historical explanation for the current
regime is one that looks mainly to power struggles as the driving
causal forces. Since there is no reason to think that such power
struggles track the truth in any meaningful way, we have no
reason to trust, and perhaps a reason to distrust the outcome of
that process. In other words, the historical evidence suggests that
we have suffered an “epistemic loss.”
In this way, critical historians share common methodological
assumptions with their targets: both assume that historical
explanations matter for evaluating current practice. Specifically,
it matters to both whether or not the truth value of the ideas
industries, such as railroads, and thus served the interests of the commercial classes who
profited from the growth of such industries). For discussions of other studies in a similar
vein, see Gordon, Legal Histories, supra note 15, at 67–68; Gordon, Historicism in Legal
Scholarship, supra note 16.
72. For examples of the “earlier generation,” see FULLER, LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF,
supra note 24, at 140; Henry M. Hart, Jr., Holmes’ Positivism—An Addendum, 64 HARV.
L. REV. 929, 930 (1951) (“Law as it is is a continuous process of becoming.”). For an
interpretation of the Hart and Sacks teaching materials along these lines, see Charles
Barzun, The Forgotten Foundations of Hart and Sacks, 99 VA. L. REV. 1 (2013). For the
ideological interpretation of legal practice, see Gordon, Critical Histories, supra note 15, at
96 n. 92 (suggesting that “the permanent importance of [Transformation of American Law]
to scholarship lies in its subtlety and richness as a history of legal ideology”); Gordon,
Historicism in Legal Scholarship, supra note 16, at 1054 (observing that “a novel genre of
legal history that treats legal doctrine as ideology, a way of structuring social experience
that seems to be a functional response to social needs but is in fact a way of making the
existing order seem natural and necessary”).
73. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A
CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 181 (1976) (“The state, a supposedly neutral overseer of
social conflict, is forever caught up in the antagonism of private interests and made the
tool of one faction or another.”).
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constituting that practice figure in the best explanation of its
current acceptance. What they typically disagree about is what, as
an historical matter, the best explanations of those practices in
fact are.
ii. Casey’s joint opinion
The ad hominem reasoning by common-law judges under the
“working itself pure” interpretation of the common law is, as I
say, largely implicit in how the common-law judge treats her legal
materials. There is, however, at least one case in which the
Supreme Court engaged explicitly in the sort of reasoning Taylor
describes. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey. Casey, of course, is not your typical Supreme Court
decision. Not only was it of great practical importance because it
decided the fate of Roe’s right to abortion, it was highly unusual—
and unusually candid—in the reasoning it employed to support its
decision to uphold Roe.
At issue in Casey were various provisions of a Pennsylvania
statute governing the procurement of abortions.74 Many thought
that the Court, having replaced several Justices with Republican
appointees in the years since Roe v. Wade (1973), would take the
opportunity to overturn that landmark decision.75 But the Court
did not do so, and the decision’s “joint opinion,” authored by
Justices O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy, discussed at great
length why Roe—or, more precisely, its “essential holding”—
should be upheld as a matter of stare decisis.76 After applying its
traditional stare-decisis analysis, the Court went on to compare
Roe to both Lochner v. New York and Plessy v. Ferguson.77 The
idea was that these now-overruled decisions were of a
“comparable dimension” to Roe because in those cases, too, the
political stakes seemed so high. The question the Court put to
itself was whether Roe was like Lochner and Plessy in some
relevant sense, thereby justifying its overruling.
What the Court concluded was that Roe was not like these
other cases. Why not? In those cases, the Court explained, there
had been a fundamental change in the Court’s understandings of

74.
75.
76.
77.

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 844–69. See id. at 846.
Id. at 861–63.
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the facts in question. In Lochner and its progeny, which protected
a “right to contract” under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, for instance, the Court had operated under the
assumption that “an unregulated market economy could satisfy
minimum levels of human welfare.”78 But the Great Depression
had proven that assumption mistaken, thereby vindicating the
Court’s decision to abandon the Lochner line of cases in West
Coast Hotel.79 Similarly, in Plessy, which held racial segregation in
public accommodations to be constitutional (if they were
“separate but equal”), the Court had stated that insofar as
segregation imposed a “badge of inferiority” on black Americans,
that was true only because “the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it.”80 But by 1954 when the Court took up the
issue again in Brown, that was no longer a plausible view of the
social meaning of segregation. 81 The Court (and society’s)
understanding of the facts of segregation had fundamentally
changed. Thus, the Court concluded, the Court’s decision to
overrule Plessy was “not only justified, but required.”82
Roe, however, was a different story. In the roughly two
decades since Roe there had been no comparable shift in
understanding of the relevant facts in question. The morality and
legality of abortion was controversial in 1973, and it remained so
in 1992. No events or social changes had occurred since 1973
which changed the “factual underpinnings of Roe’s central
holding [ ] or our understanding of it” in a way comparable to
what had occurred in the years between Lochner and West Coast
Hotel and between Plessy and Brown. 83 Therefore, the Court
concluded, were the Court to overturn Roe, it would be perceived
(and justifiably so) not as a ruling of principle but instead as
simply a result of the changing composition of the Court.84
It is not hard to see how this analysis displays ad hominem
model of reasoning. The Court was effectively saying that there
had been “epistemic gains” in the relevant domains between
Lochner and West Coast Hotel and between Plessy and Brown,
78. Id. at 862.
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896)).
81. The Court also noted, citing Justice Harlan’s dissent, that the view may not even
have been plausible in 1896 when Plessy was decided. Id.
82. Id. at 863.
83. Id. at 864.
84. Id.
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but that there had not been any such gain with respect to abortion
since Roe. Rather than apply general criteria to these earlier
decisions as the apodeictic model requires (and as Chief Justice
Rehnquist, in dissent, did 85 ), the Court reasoned by means of
historical explanation: since the Court’s change in doctrine
between those earlier cases could be best explained as the
consequence of increased social and economic awareness of
societal facts (and hence moral progress), the Court’s confidence
that change of a constitutional dimension had taken place was
warranted. But since one did not see such an increase in awareness
of societal facts (or “epistemic gains”) with respect to abortion
since 1973, no such confidence was warranted here. Hence, Roe
should not be overruled.
In this way, Casey is unusual among Supreme Court opinions
in the explicitness with which it describes the sort of reasoning
necessary to make sense of “living constitutionalism” as a theory
of constitutional interpretation. By that term, I mean to describe
the view that the meaning of the Constitution changes over time.86
Of course, the Court often practices living constitutionalism in the
sense that it reinterprets or overturns previous cases. 87 But in
Casey, the Court trained its sights on different time periods in our
history and openly asked what it would take for the Court to
validate the changes experienced during those periods as genuine
growth or improvement, constitutionally speaking. The answer
offered—that there must have been a change in the facts or an
“understanding of the facts”—may be hard to apply (like many
other broad constitutional principles and standards). But the
85. See id. at 961 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“When the Court finally recognized
its error in West Coast Hotel, it did not engage in the post hoc rationalization that the joint
opinion attributes to it today; it did not state that Lochner had been based on an economic
view that had fallen into disfavor, and that it therefore should be overruled. Chief Justice
Hughes in his opinion for the Court simply recognized what Justice Holmes had previously
recognized in his Lochner dissent, that ‘[t]he Constitution does not speak of freedom of
contract.’”).
86. See Strauss, supra note 24, at 2 (“A “living constitution” is one that evolves,
changes over time, and adapts to new circumstances, without being formally amended.”);
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism versus Living Constitutionalism: The Conceptual
Structure of the Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1244 (2019). (“Living
constitutionalists contend that constitutional law can and should evolve in response to
changing circumstances and values.”).
87. See, e.g., 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (in overturning Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986), observing that recent legal developments eliminating sodomy laws “show an
emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding
how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex”).
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point is that the Court seemed to recognize that taking seriously
the living part of “living constitutionalism” requires that
constitutional justification depend, at least in part, on historical
explanation.88
Now there are a variety of questions and objections one
might raise about this argument and my interpretation of it. The
most obvious objection would be to deny that the argument was
doing any real work. It was just a post hoc rationalization for what
was essentially a political decision. But that charge could be
leveled against almost any Supreme Court decision. My own view
is that the argument discussed here genuinely reflects Justice
Souter’s judicial philosophy in a way that is consistent with how
he decided other cases, but I have defended that claim elsewhere
and so put it aside here.89
Let me instead focus on just two other objections. The first
goes to the particular historical explanations offered by the Court,
and it asks whether they are the most plausible ones. How do we
know the change really did involve an epistemic gain? Were there
not lots of factors, having nothing to do with improved
understanding of the consequences of an unregulated market
economy or the meaning of segregation, that could explain West
Coast Hotel and Brown, respectively?
This objection is of the same sort as the critical historians’
critique to the effect that the common law does not “work itself
pure” but instead entrenches powerful interests. The proper
response in both cases is to say, “maybe so, but that is the right
question to ask.” Casey shows how historical explanation can be
relevant to answering a legal question, not that it necessarily got
the explanation right. This objection nicely focuses our attention
on the sorts of considerations that we would want to know in
order to best answer the historical questions.
For one thing, we might want to know the actual motivations
of the Courts deciding the cases. Were the Justices in Lochner
baldly trying to serve the interests of the commercial class to
which they belonged? If so, then those facts add further support
to the Court’s analysis because they suggest that the Lochner

88. It is thus striking that Strauss’s book on the subject does not even mention Casey.
89. See Charles Barzun, Justice Souter’s Common Law, 104 VA. L. REV. 655 (2018).
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Court was even more confused and more beset by a “motivated
neglect” of relevant considerations than originally thought.90
But such self-interested or improper motivations are neither
necessary nor sufficient to render a court’s judgment suspect. That
is because it is not the sincerity of the reasons but the extent to
which they are likely to track the truth that matters. So, for
instance, the Lochner majority may have genuinely believed that
the due process clause protected the rights of contract and
property in the way it claimed, but if that genuine belief merely
reflected the fact that those justices were deeply in the grip of a
laissez-faire, even Social Darwinist, ideology at the time, then that
would give reason to doubt the decision’s correctness as a
constitutional matter.
At the same time, even selfish or unprincipled motivations
might align the court with genuine constitutional requirements.
Imagine, for example, that the Brown Court in 1954 didn’t care a
whip about the black students suffering under Jim Crow and
thought the Plessy Court had more or less gotten the
constitutional question right. Yet they were deeply concerned
with the nation’s standing in the Cold War, and they feared that
the Russians could use effectively the conditions in the south for
Anti-American propaganda throughout the world, buoying the
communist cause. 91 Even if that’s true, it suggests that the
consequence of this concern would be a felt need to make the
Court stand up for what are, arguably, the nation’s highest ideals
of freedom and equality. Thus, all the more reason to think that a
decision based on such motivations—even if unprincipled—
yielded epistemic gain.
In short, under this model of legal reasoning, the historical
explanations of past decisions relied upon—whether those
explanations look to psychological, political, sociological,
economic, intellectual considerations—are relevant to a court
deciding a present legal issue to which those previous cases speak.
Nothing is off the table, and the question we would want to ask
about any of them is whether we have reason to think that such
90. Cf., Taylor, Explanation, supra note 22, at 53 (describing ad hominem reasoning
as a method by which one attempts to produce error-reducing transitions by, among other
things, “rescuing from (usually motivated) neglect a consideration whose significance they
cannot contest”).
91. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2002).
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forces would yield epistemic gains about what our constitutional
principles require. Historical explanation becomes central to the
practical task at hand.
But also central to the task is reflection on constitutional
principles. For just as in the cases of Joe and Pete, discussed
above, part of our judgment about whether a gain has occurred is
going to depend on our prior confidence that the practice at issue
(in this case, the doctrinal developments set in motion by Brown
and West Coast Hotel) are in fact rightly decided in the way
assumed. The more confident we are in our legal and moral
convictions that the case in question was rightly decided, the more
likely we are to find plausible the truth-tracking explanations of
it. In this way, the process of reasoning is a holistic one.
The difference between Lochner and Plessy here illustrates
the point. Whereas virtually no one today would defend Plessy’s
separate-but-equal regime, Lochner continues to have its
defenders.92 Those defenders today offer genealogical historical
accounts intended to undermine the Court’s abandonment of the
right to contract by showing that it was the result of unprincipled
political behavior.93 On the model of reasoning presented here,
such accounts are not necessarily ends-driven, improperly
motivated “law-office” history; they are the product of ad
hominem practical reasoning. Since the convictions of Lochner’s
defenders make them doubt that any epistemic gain was achieved
by abandoning the doctrine, they reasonably look to alternative
explanations as to why that road was taken.
The second objection challenges the ad hominem model itself
by denying its rationality. If there are no general criteria by which
one can assess whether a given explanation is the correct one, then
it seems as if the answers to these questions are fundamentally
indeterminate. Furthermore, if the process of reasoning requires,
as I have suggested, a judge to compare the proffered
justifications for practices to the proffered explanations of them,

92. See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2012); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
HOW THE PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION (2006).
93. See, e.g., RANDY BARNETT: RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 125 (2013) (characterizing the famous “Brandeis Brief” as part
of an attack on the “Republican Constitution” and observing that Brandeis was “driven
more by his progressive ends than by any principled concern for ‘realist’ judicial
decisionmaking”).
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so that she has to render judgment about them in some kind of
brute, intuitive way, then it hardly qualifies as “reasoning” at all.94
This is a deep objection, and I cannot adequately respond to
it here. But let me close by offering two reasons to resist it. The
first is a “companions in guilt” sort of argument: the same
skeptical worries of indeterminacy plague virtually all other
theories of moral and legal reasoning, too. There may not be any
determinate answers as to what the “original understanding” of
the fourteenth amendment was or what “equality” demands as a
moral matter or what the best interpretation of the case law on
some disputed issue is. But courts and scholars continue to debate
such questions and typically feel capable of distinguishing
between better and worse answers. The same may be true here as
well.
But the second and more important response begins by
observing, as Taylor does, that ad hominem reasoning is pervasive
in our daily lives. It comes so naturally because we live in a world
rife with both moral complexity and factual uncertainty—
especially with respect to the motivations of others and our own.
We are constantly trying to figure out whether we are seeing
things clearly—and, if not, why not—and we do so by comparing
factual propositions with moral ones: Was I right to break up with
A? (moral) Or were the reasons I gave just rationalizations?
(factual) If so, what was the real explanation of my decision?
(factual) Is my friend right that I should turn down a lucrative job
offer on ethical grounds (moral), or is she just jealous of the high
salary (factual)? Am I in denial about my child’s aggressive
behavior (factual), or was I right to complain to the principal
about the teacher’s treatment of her (moral)? Each of these
questions require us to compare different moral perspectives or
positions, whether hypothetical or real, and then to try to discern
whether a shift from one position to another would be an
epistemic gain or loss.
If ad hominem reasoning does play a central role in everyday
practical reasoning, then it begins to look a lot like other standard
forms of legal reasoning that have been criticized as irrational (or
at best, non-rational) yet have a firm foundation in common
sense. Reasoning by authority, the first model considered, in some
94. Taylor himself raises these concerns in his essay. See Taylor, Explanation, supra
note 22, at 52–53.
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contexts might be considered irrational.95 Analogical reasoning is
another feature of legal argument whose status as genuine
reasoning has been called into question.96 Yet we pervasively rely
on both authorities and analogies when managing our own affairs
or evaluating the work of those tasked with managing the affairs
of others, or of our nation’s. And at least in part for just that
reason, such patterns of inference are widely accepted as valid
forms of judicial reasoning.
CONCLUSION
This last point raises the broader question of whether the
genetic fallacy is fallacious in practical reasoning generally—an
issue I bracketed at the outset. As I indicated then, in my view, it
is not a fallacy. It seems to me that we commonly and properly
care about where certain ideas, beliefs, and practices come from,
even if what we learn is not alone sufficient to upset our settled
convictions about them.97 I will close this essay not so much by
offering a full philosophical defense of this view, which is a task
too large to take on here. Instead, I will merely try to motivate its
appeal by tracing out some of its implications.
To do so, let’s return to where we began, with Justice
Thomas’s concurrence. Now there is a sense in which his critics
are plainly right: the fact that past presidents of Planned
Parenthood or anyone else thought abortion should be promoted
95. See COHEN AND NAGEL, supra note 1, at 193 (distinguishing between valid and
FALLACIOUS,
invalid
uses
of
authority).
See
also
LOGICALLY
https://www.logicallyfallacious.com/tools/lp/Bo/LogicalFallacies/21/Appeal-to-Authority
(last visted Nov. 3, 2019) (characterizing “appeal to authority” as the insistence that “a
claim is true simply because a valid authority or expert on the issue said it was true, without
any other supporting evidence offered”).
96. On the significance and rationality of analogical reasoning, compare LLOYD L.
WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT (2005)
(defending analogical reasoning as both valid and pervasive in the law) with Richard A.
Posner, Book Review: Reasoning by Analogy, 91 CORN. L. REV. 761, 765 (2006) (reviewing
Weinreb’s book and arguing that analogical reasoning is not reasoning, properly
understood, and that it belongs “not to legal thought, but to legal rhetoric”). See also, supra
note 26, at 98.
97. Cf. Plunkett, supra note 21, at 59 (“If my arguments in this paper are on the right
track, then philosophers engaged in normative inquiry shouldn’t dismiss facts about the
emergence of and past use of concepts as epistemically irrelevant in virtue of their being
historical facts of this sort.”); Vavova, supra note 32, at 138 (in defending the potential
undermining power of the discovery of irrelevant influences on one’s belief formation,
asserting that “[l]earning that I was hypnotized to believe that Portland is the capital of
Maine should cast doubt on that belief just as reading an outdated atlas that says it’s
Augusta should”).
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for eugenicist reasons does not itself tell us anything about the
moral or policy considerations on which one might think its
legality today should depend. A deontological or rights theorist
would want to know the moral status of a fetus (perhaps at
different stages of growth) and whether the legality of abortion is
required by the best theory of sex equality or of individual liberty.
A consequentialist would want to know what effects banning
abortion would have on women, children, and society more
generally, and she’d want to compare those effects with those
produced by a regime in which abortion is permitted. None of
these considerations seem to depend on who first began practicing
or advocating for abortion, when they did so, or why.
But if the assumptions that provide the critical content for
the evaluations people actually make—one’s brute intuitions
about the moral status of fetuses or one’s judgments about which
“effects” count in the cost-benefit analysis and for how much—if
such assumptions, for any given analysis, are at least in part a
product of the society and culture in which we live (and how could
they not be, really?), then either one of two things is true: either
we can discriminate between better and worse explanations
(epistemically speaking) for why a moral position came to be held,
or why a practice came to be accepted, or we cannot do so. On the
individual level, we can either distinguish brainwashing from
genuine learning, or we cannot do so; on the societal level, we can
either distinguish political change effected under conditions of
genuine free expression and democratic processes from one
brought about through repression and coercion, or we cannot do
so.
If the first of these alternatives is true, so that we can, at least
in theory, make such discriminations, then the genetic fallacy is
not a fallacy. The reason is that it would always be possible to
show that the input into a person’s moral evaluation or costbenefit analysis has been corrupted in some way. As software
developers say, “garbage in, garbage out.” If your understanding
of the moral status of the fetus has been distorted through
ideological indoctrination, then the outcome of an analysis in
which that understanding figures ought not be trusted. It is akin
to showing a chemist that her sample under study has been
contaminated.
I think this is the best way of understanding Justice Thomas’s
argument. He was essentially trying to show that support for
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abortion grew out of a way of thinking about human life that was
corrupted from the start. Even if abortion advocates today do not
endorse the eugenicist ideas of the past, the relatively low moral
status their policies implicitly ascribe to human fetuses is best
explained as the product of a toxic ideology that is willing to
sacrifice weak and vulnerable individuals for the sake of social
“progress,” however understood. Garbage in, garbage out.
If that reconstruction sounds charitable, I in no way mean to
suggest that it’s right. Rather, part of my point is just that it ill
becomes progressives to cry “genetic fallacy” (or “guilt by
association”). For one of the core claims of radical and
progressive social movements going back at least to Karl Marx has
been the insistence that we ought not accept current
arrangements (especially those related to race, class, or sex)
because those arrangements are products of repressive and
coercive practices rather than the expression of a genuinely free
and enlightened popular will.98 In other words, they argue that we
have reason to doubt that our political structures are really the
product of “epistemic gains.” So, for instance, abortion supporters
can point to the way in which the pro-life movement may have
developed in the nineteenth century as a means to stifle women’s
increasing freedom and political power.99
I do mean to suggest, however, that what’s sauce for the
goose is sauce for the gander. Any theory that sees progress at
work in human history would be vacuous if it understood such
progress to follow necessarily from the advancing of time. Yet if
progress cannot be so guaranteed, then it always remains an open

98. Cf. RAYMOND GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY 88 (1981) (explaining
that the task of “Ideology-critique” as elaborated by Critical Theorists, is to show people
that the “world-picture” necessary to maintain the legitimacy of current institutions is
“false consciousness,” which the critique accomplishes “by showing them that it is
reflectively unacceptable to them, i.e., by showing them that they could have acquired it
only under conditions of coercion”).
99. Jennfier L. Holland, Abolishing Abortion: The History of the Pro-Life Movement
in America, Organization of American Historians, https://tah.oah.org/november-2016
/abolishing-abortion-the-history-of-the-pro-life-movement-in-america/ (last visited Nov.
3, 2019) (“[T]he fetus was merely a stand-in for a broader cultural project. Here, the
movement tapped into concerns over women’s increasing education, autonomy, and the
extension of rights, as it reasserted women’s connection to and limitation by their own
reproductive anatomy.”).
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question whether there has been a wrong turn, with respect to
certain issues, at some previous point.100
Which brings us back to the second of the alternatives posed
above. Under this view, it is not possible, in fact or in theory, to
distinguish between better and worse explanations of our current
social and legal practices. We only believe what we believe and do
what we do as a result of causal processes that are either
impossible to discern or entirely arbitrary from an epistemic or
moral point of view, or both. It is contingency all the way down.
If that’s true, then the genetic fallacy is indeed a fallacy, and
the suggestion that the common law “works itself pure” is indeed
a myth. But so, too, are historical critiques that trace current
practices back to sources of oppression, whether along the lines
of race, class, sex, or anything else. What is more, the logic and
appeal of a “living” constitution becomes somewhat of a mystery.

100. An alternative view to the one expressed here is the view that assertions of moral
progress are nothing more than moral judgments, so that historical explanations properly
play no role whatsoever. But this view amounts to a skeptical account of progress insofar
as the concept itself does no work in one’s overall reasoning. See RONALD DWORKIN,
JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 87 (2011) (“[W]e are entitled to no more confidence in our
judgment of progress when we can offer [various historical] explanations [of progress] than
when we can say only that earlier generations did not “see” some moral truth that we do.
In either case we are relying finally on our conviction and on the moral case that we believe
supports it.”). For an older defense of a similar view, see R. G. Collingwood, A Philosophy
of Progress, 1 THE REALIST 77 (1929) (“The question whether, on the whole, history shows
a progress can be answered, as we now see, by asking another question. Have you the
courage of your convictions? If you have, if you regard the things which you are doing as
things worth doing, then the course of history which has led to the doing of them is justified
by its results, and its movement is a movement forward.”).

